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Abstract
It has been empirically shown that structural holes in social networks enable potential large
benets to those individuals who bridge them (Burt, 2004). The pioneering paper Goyal and
Vega-Redondo (2007) oers a new incentives based explanation of this phenomenon. But the main
equilibrium network of their model does not display a basic empirical regularity: the architecture
of social networks is characterized by the existence of densely linked communities loosely connected
to one another (Granovetter, 1983). This paper analyzes the conditions under which agents who
benet from bridging structural holes can be sustained in equilibrium networks constituted by
densely linked groups.
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11 Introduction
Networks provide answers to many economic questions. They are often means of communication and for
the allocation of goods and services not traded in markets. For example, a network of personal contacts
plays a critical role in obtaining information about job opportunities1; networks underlie the trade
and exchange of goods in non-centralized markets2 and also dene the conguration of international
alliances and trading agreements3, among others.
In environments where social networks provide a platform for the ow of information, two relevant
aspects need to be considered: timing and control. With respect to timing, social contacts can accelerate
the acquisition of information generating a rst-mover advantage. People can seize such opportunities
or pass information along to another member of the network who can benet from it. Research environ-
ments are examples of this relevant aspect. Control is another important feature. A person that is the
unique contact between two dierent people or groups of people benets from the control over the ow
of information, adapting it to specic strategic interests. Timing and control suggest that the payos
an agent obtains are highly dependent on the position in the social network and, in particular, on the
agent's capacity to bridge gaps among agents. This argument is central in Granovetter (1974) and in
the story behind the structural holes phenomenon. The notion of structural hole was rst introduced
by Burt (1992) and can be dened as a disconnection among agents on a network structure. Several
authors4 provide empirical evidence that people who bridge structural holes in social networks have
signicantly higher payos. In particular, Burt (2004) shows, in a rm environment, that compensa-
tion, positive performance evaluations, promotions and good ideas are disproportionately in the hands
of people whose networks span structural holes.
1See Granovetter (1974), Calv o-Armengol (2004)
2See Kranton and Minehart (2001), Charness et al. (2001)
3See Goyal and Joshi (2006)
4See Burt (1992), Mehra et al. (2003), Podolny and Baron (1997), Ahuja (2000)
2Economic theory has recently focused on the issue to provide incentives based answers to the fol-
lowing question: How can structural holes and their associated large payos dierentials be sustainable
when agents strategically decide their connections? Classical Economics can provide several arguments
to explain this empirical fact. First, agents who bridge structural holes (bridge-agents hereafter) may
have an a priori advantage with respect to the rest. For example, they can have higher communication
skills that imply lower link formation costs. This heterogeneity among agents' features would explain
the heterogeneity among agents' equilibrium payos. Second, imperfect information can also explain
the existence of bridge-agents in equilibrium. If agents ignore the actual payos of their neighbors or
the structure of links among them, they do not even realize the potential gains of a deviation. Beyond
these arguments, the pioneering paper Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) provided an alternative answer
to the question that requires neither ex-ante heterogeneity among agents nor imperfect information.
The authors present a model where every pair of linked agents (directly or indirectly) create a unit
of surplus. If the connection is direct the two players split the surplus equally while if it is indirect then
intermediate players also get a share of the surplus. Thus individuals form links with others to create
surplus, to gain intermediation rents and to circumvent others who are trying to become intermediary.
The star network is prominent in Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) for a certain cost range (neither too
low nor, obviously, too high). This equilibrium structure benets the central agent with an extraordinary
potential for obtaining uncommonly high payos. In consequence, the authors show how self-interested
individuals can organize themselves forming equilibrium topologies that enable potential large benets
to bridge-agents in a setting with perfect information and ex-ante identical agents.
Actual social networks present very complex topologies. Empirical research shows that these net-
works usually consist of densely connected groups (also called clusters) with a few links across them.
Some examples of these clusters are communities in a geographic region, departments in a rm, groups
within a profession or members of a sports team. Figure 1 corresponds to a division of labor familiar
3from Durkheim (1893) and it clearly illustrates the commented network structure.
Figure 1: A real network with highly connected clusters
The network in gure 1 represents a view of the world which has been often put forward to explain
the 'strength of weak ties' theory5. According to this theory, the world consists of families or com-
munities with very strong ties among their members. These families are connected by trade relations
or occupational colleagueships to other families but these interfamily ties are typically weaker than
intrafamily ties. In our analysis we omit the discussion about the strength of the ties but we focus on
this empirically based network architecture. This network structure has been observed not only in large
social networks but also in organizations and rms. Burt (2004) focus on data describing 673 managers
who ran the supply chain in 2001 for one of America's largest electronic companies. The study shows
that there are clusters of managers within business units. To make the clusters more apparent, Burt
looked at the top 89 senior people to see the core of the supply-chain network, drawn in gure 2. Shaded
areas indicate business units. Managers not in a shaded area work at corporate headquarters. There
are 514 connections in the sociogram at the top gure 2: 62% between managers in the same business
unit, 35% with managers at headquarters and only 3% between managers in dierent business units.
5See, for example, gure 2 in Granovetter (1973) or gure 1 in Friedkin (1980).
4The bottom of gure 2 (headquarters are removed) provides a stark illustration of the fragile contact
across business units.
Figure 2: Clusters in a small network
The objective of this paper is to link the theoretical model Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) with
the empirical evidence related to the shape of social networks. In particular, this work aims to analyze
the conditions for having bridge-agents in equilibrium using the theoretical setting introduced above
5when society is exogenously organized forming densely connected communities.
We apply the widely used Pairwise-Nash Equilibrium concept (PNE)6 to our analysis and show that
in order to sustain bridge-agents in equilibrium, (i) the size of the communities should be suciently
small and (ii) bridge-agents cannot connect a pair of suciently large (groups of) communities. These
results generalize the argument by Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) that players bridging structural
holes can exist in a setting with ex-ante identical agents and perfect information to the case with
densely connected communities. These bridge-agents can obtain large equilibrium payos dierentials
as illustrated by the examples at the end of Section 3.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we present the basic setting of the
model and notation. In Section 3 we discuss the results of the model. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
The set up of the model is based on Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007).
Let N = f1;2;:::;ng be the nite set of ex-ante identical agents that make up the population. These
agents play a network-formation game with the following characteristics: the strategy of every player
consists of making an announcement of intended links. These announcements are simultaneous. Let
si = (si1;:::;si;i 1;si;i+1;:::;sin) be the strategy vector of player i, where sij 2 f0;1g and sij = 1 means
that player i intends to form a link with player j, while sij = 0 means that player i does not intend to
form such a link. Links represent pairwise relations among agents. A link between two individuals is
undirected (both agents benet from its existence and participate in its cost), can be severed by one of
them unilaterally but can only be created by mutual consent of the two implied individuals. Formally,
a link between two players i and j is formed if and only if sijsji = 1. Let gij = 1 denote the existence
6See Goyal and Yoshi (2006), Calv o-Armengol (2004) and Bloch and Jackson (2005) for denitions and applications
of this concept.
6of a link between i and j while gij = 0 denotes the absence of a link. Notice that a strategy prole
s = (s1;s2;:::;sn) induces a unique network g(s). A path in g connecting i1 and in is a set of distinct
nodes fi1;i2;:::;ing  N such that gi1i2 = gi2i3 = ::: = gin 1in = 1. All players with whom i has a path
constitute the component of i in g, which is denoted by Ci(g). If all the players belong to the same
component, the network is said to be connected.
2.1 Topological assumptions
As commented in the introduction, we are interested in reproducing the kind of network topologies that
present densely connected clusters of agents. To this end, we assume that agents are exogenously located
in an underlying structure, and that the cost of having a link between two players (c(d)) depends on
the distance between their locations in this underlying structure7. Henceforth, we refer to this distance
as topological distance. The geodesic distance between two agents is dened as the number of nodes of
the shortest path between them.
The eects of topological distance on the cost of links can be motivated along the following lines.
First, one may want to think of distance from a geographic point of view. In that case, the cost of a
link between two agents directly depends on the physical distance between them. Second, topological
distance may be interpreted relative to some social characteristic space. A direct relationship between
linking costs and topological distance in this social metric will reproduce agents' tendency to associate
with others similar to them (according to age, race, gender, religion, profession). This tendency is
known as homophily and has been documented quite broadly8.
In this paper we assume that agents are exogenously distributed in communities or neighborhoods
and that the cost of a link depends on the community of the two implicated individuals: c(d) = cl
if the two agents belong to the same community and c(d) = ch otherwise (where ch > cl). As we
7See Gilles and Johnson (2000) and Galleotti et al (2006)
8see McPherson et al (2001)
7already mentioned, we attempt to reproduce densely connected groups of agents in equilibrium. This
will happen when cl is suciently small. For simplicity, we assume that cl = 0. Let M be the total
number of communities (M  3). Let Mi be a typical community and let mi = jMij. We consider that
mi > 1 8i 9.
2.2 Payo function and equilibrium concept
The payo function is such that any pair of connected players (i and j) generates one unit of surplus.
The distribution of this unit depends on the intermediaries between i and j and on the nature of
competition between intermediaries. We assume that any two paths between any two players fully
compete away the entire surplus ( a la Bertrand competition). Therefore, an intermediary between i
and j (say k) can retain part of the surplus generated by i and j if and only if this intermediary lies
on all paths connecting i and j. If this condition holds, we will say that player k is an essential player
for i and j. For example, in a star network10 the central player is essential since no pair of players can
ever avoid her on any path connecting them.
Two agents connected by a link incur a cost c(d) 2 fch;clg. Let E(j;k;g) be the set of essential agents
in g between j and k and let e(j;k;g) = jE(j;k;g)j. Then, for every strategy prole s = (s1;s2;:::;sn),











  [i(g)ch + i(g)cl]
where Ifi2E(j;k)g is an indicator function specifying whether i is essential for j and k, i(g)  jfj 2 N :
j = 2 Mi;gij = 1gj denotes the number of external links of i, and i(g)  jfj 2 N : j 2 Mi;gij = 1gj
denotes the number of non-external links of i. The rst term represents i's access payos while the
second term represents her intermediation payos.
9The case mi = 1 8i is analyzed in Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007).
10In a star network a unique agent is linked to all agents and no other agent has any additional link.
8Given that link creation requires mutual consent of the two players involved and that agents can
announce any combination of links they wish (multidimensional strategy space), a coordination problem
arises. As such, the game displays a multiplicity of Nash equilibria where mutually benecial links can be
left aside11. This is solved if players are allowed to coordinate bilaterally. For this reason, renements on
Nash equilibrium that allow for coalitional moves are usually applied to this kind of network-formation
games. One of the most widely used renements is the pairwise-Nash equilibrium that is dened as
follows:
Denition 1 A strategy prole sPN is a Pairwise-Nash equilibrium (PNE) if the following conditions
hold:
 for any i 2 N and every si 2 Si , i(sPN)  i(si;sPN
 i )
 for any pair of players i;j 2 N and every strategy pair (si;sj) in which sil = sPN
il ; 8l 6=
j and sjk = sPN










Networks generated by a PNE strategy prole g(sPN) are robust to deviations of unilateral multilink
severance (that is the usual Nash Equilibrium requirement) and to deviations of bilateral commonly
agreed one-link creation. That is, a PNE network is a Nash Equilibrium network where, in addition,
no mutually benecial link can be formed.
Alternative equilibrium notions that allow for coalitional moves have been used in the literature 12.
One of them is the Bilateral Equilibrium (BE) concept used in Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007). A
BE network must be robust to deviations consisting of bilateral commonly agreed one-link creation,
to unilateral multilink severance and to deviations consisting of a simultaneous combination of the
11For example, a strategy prole in which no player announces a link (resulting in the empty network) is always a Nash
equilibrium.
12See Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) and Jackson and van den Nouweland (2000)
9previous deviations by any given pair of individuals. Thus, the BE concept is stricter than the PNE.
The analysis of our model under the BE concept is beyond the scope of this paper but it can be showed
that no network (apart from the pseudo-empty network dened below) can be sustained as a BE because
agents have too many deviation possibilities. In consequence, individuals can always deviate to gain
intermediation rents or to circumvent others who are trying to become intermediary.
Before the analysis of the model, we review some graph-theoretic notions that will be used repeatedly
throughout the paper. If a component Ci(g) contains an essential player i then Ci(g) can be split in,
at least, three parts: two i-groups and i. Each player in Ci(g) is included in one of these parts. Two
players j;k 2 Ci(g) are members of dierent i-groups if i is essential for connecting them.
If gij = 1 for all pairs i;j 2 Mi, the network among the members of Mi is said to be complete. A link
between two agents of dierent communities is said to be external. A community with no external links
is said to be isolated. A community Mi is essential if there is a pair of communities Mj and Mk such
that every path that links any member of Mj to any member of Mk contains some member of Mi (not
necessarily the same). If such a pair of communities does not exist then Mi is said to be non-essential.
A non-essential community can be extreme or non-extreme. Mi is extreme if all the external links of
its players connect them to members of the same community. If the members of Mi have, at least, two
external links to two dierent communities, Mi is non-extreme.
Finally, let us dene some particular network topologies. A network is said to be pseudo-empty if
it has no external links. A group of p communities constitute a cycle if they can be ordered in a list
M1;M2;:::;Mp such that Mp and M1 are connected and Mi is linked to Mi+1 for i = f1;2;:::;p   1g
and there is no other external links among them.
3 Results
We start by clarifying the implications of having cl = 0.
10Remark 1 For cl = 0, a PNE network should not contain agents that are essential for two members
of the same community.
Notice that if there is an essential agent (say i) between two members of the same community,
then they can create a link between them and, in consequence, they would avoid the payment of the
intermediation rents to agent i with no cost. This implies that, in any PNE network, members of any
given community should form a suciently dense network among them. This would guarantee the
non-existence of essential agents for two members of the same community. For example, the complete
network between members of the same community always satisfy this requirement for any community
size.
Given Remark 1, we can focus on the analysis of the equilibrium inter-community structures. The
following result is the rst step on this direction.
Lemma 1 A PNE network that contains some non-essential agent with external links must be con-
nected.
Proof. See Appendix.
In other words, a multi-component network cannot be sustained as a PNE when some non-essential
agent has external links. In the proof we show that in such a case there always exists a protable
deviation consisting on the creation of a critical link.
We can go one step further and announce the next result:
Proposition 1 In a PNE network there can be at most one component Ci containing more than one
community. Moreover, for a given ch, isolated communities should be smaller than any non-essential
community in Ci.
Proof. See Appendix.
11This result narrows the set of PNE networks. In particular, in equilibrium we can have (i) a
connected network, (ii) a pseudo-empty network, or (iii) a network with a unique multi-community
component and isolated communities. The last two networks reect a coordination problem and they
can be sustained when ch is suciently high13. The result also establishes an upper bound on the size
of the isolated groups. Notice that for a given ch, a network with suciently big isolated communities
would oer the possibility of protable deviations to the creators of critical links.
Our interest is to show whether bridge-agents who get a signicantly larger payo due to their
strategic position on the network can be sustained in equilibrium. That is, we want to see whether
essential players can exist in PNE. For this reason, we focus on the multi-community component Ci
and show the conditions that must be satised for having bridge agents in Ci (notice that there can
be equilibrium networks with no essential agents; for example, a cycle of communities with no essential
agents can be sustained as a PNE).
The next result imposes an important restriction on the set of PNE networks that contain essential
agents. Let m

be the size of the smallest community in Ci.
Proposition 2 A PNE network cannot contain essential agents when m

is suciently large .
Proof. Let us assume that g is a PNE network with an essential player i 2 Mi. Notice that there are,
at least, two i-groups. The smallest group has, at least, m

  1 agents (the rest of members of Mi). If
m

is large, then there is always the possibility to create a new link between two players of two dierent
i-groups circumventing the essential player i. Once that link is created, the deviators increase their
access payo with respect to the members of the other i-group. Since the minimum size of these groups
is proportional to m

, we conclude that, for any ch, there is always a suciently large m

which makes
that deviation protable. This contradicts the initial statement of stability and concludes the proof.
13In the pseudo-empty network, the creation of an external link between Mi and Mj is unprotable if its cost exceeds
the prot of linking the other community which is equal to 1
2 + 1
3(mj   1) + 1
3(mi   1) + 1
4(mj   1)(mi   1).
12Thus, sustainability of bridge-agents in equilibrium imposes an upper bound on community size.
For suciently large m

, the gross gains derived from circumventing a bridge-agent always exceeds the
costs of the additional link. So the upper bound on m

is a function of the costs of forming links ch. This
result is in accordance with the ndings by Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) in the following sense. The
authors' setting can be considered as a particular case of our model where the size of the community
is extremely small, i.e. mi = 1 8i. In this case, the authors show that essential players naturally exist
in equilibrium. Proposition 2 shows that a small community size is necessary for sustaining agents
enjoying large payos dierentials in equilibrium.
The above proposition does not restrict the size of that dierentials. Notice that essential players
can obtain high intermediation payos when MCi is large, where MCi is the number of communities in
component Ci. Next, we study the existence of essential players when MCi is large (in the spirit of Goyal
and Vega-Redondo (2007), we are interested in analyzing the possibility of sustaining bridge-agents in
equilibrium for arbitrarily large populations).
Proposition 3 Suppose MCi is large. Given ch, a PNE network contains at most one essential
player14. Moreover, in a PNE network with an essential player i, the size of all i-groups but one
should be suciently small.
Proof. By contradiction, let us assume that there are at least two essential players i and j in a PNE
network. Notice that these two players must be located in a multi-community component (say Ci) and
that there must exist at least one i-group that does not contain j and one j-group that does not contain
i. Let k and l be two agents contained in each of these two groups respectively. We claim that for
suciently large MCi, there always exists a protable deviation. Three cases need to be considered:
First, suppose that the size of these two groups is not proportional to MCi. In this case, if k and l
14This result directly follows from assuming that ch is constant. In a richer setting that allows for multiple cost values,
multiple bridge agents could be sustained in equilibrium if the cost of creating a link between them is relatively high.
13create a link between them they will circumvent an essential player (i and j, respectively) to reach
the rest of the population which size is proportional to MCi. Then, for any ch we can always nd a
suciently large MCi under which the deviation would be protable. Second, if the size of these two
groups is proportional to MCi, the same deviation will also be protable. Finally, suppose that the size
of only one of these two groups is proportional to MCi (say the i-group that does not contain j). In
this case, if l and i form a link between them then i increases her intermediation payos obtained from
the intermediation between the two groups and l circumvents an essential player to reach the i-group
that does not contain j. Both marginal payos are proportional to MCi; therefore the deviation would
be also protable for a suciently large number of communities, contradicting the initial statement.
On the other hand, let us assume (by contradiction with the second statement of the proposition)
that there is an essential player i and two i-groups whose size is proportional to MCi in a PNE network. If
two members contained in each of these two i-groups create a link between them, they would circumvent
the essential player i in order to reach the other group. Since the size of that group is proportional to
MCi, for any ch, the marginal payo will be positive for suciently large MCi, contradicting stability.
This proposition suggests that, in equilibrium, essential agents should bridge extreme groups with
the rest of the society. Specically, for any pair of i-groups the size of one of them must be suciently
small for any given ch. To see this relationship let us analyze the following example:
Example 1 Consider a network consisting of a cycle of communities with only one group Mi that has a
single player i with external links. In that case, agent i is essential in connecting Mi and the rest of the
population. This network is a PNE if the population is suciently large and ch > (mi  1)=6. It is easy
to see that the marginal payo for deleting an external link depends negatively on M. Therefore, given
ch, the marginal payo is negative for a suciently large M. On the other hand, the most protable
possibility for creating a new link (to add a link circumventing the essential player i) generates a marginal




which is negative under the initial conditions stated above. Thus, the network is PNE.
This example shows a particular inequality that must hold between ch and the size of one of the
i-groups (Mi in that case). This inequality could not be generalized but it already illustrates the
intuition of Proposition 3. Thus, all i-groups except one should be small for any essential agent i. In
consequence, in a PNE bridge agents should link relatively small (groups of) communities with the
rest of the population. When geodesic distances are long, this would imply that bridge agents must be
located in peripheral positions of the network. But when geodesic distances are short, bridge agents
can be very centered as shown in the next example.
Example 2 Consider a network with a unique component in which a unique essential player (i) has
two links to each i-group. Moreover, there is only one community in each i-group and no additional
links. For simplicity, assume that all communities have the same size m. We claim that such a network
is a PNE if M is suciently large and the linking cost is not suciently low to justify an additional
direct connection. Specically, suppose that m=6 < ch < 1
12[m(m(M  2)+2(m 1))+3mM 1
M 1 ]. Then
the payos of the central player are positive and equal to






(m   1)m(M   1)
3
  2(M   1)ch





(mM   m + 2)(m   1)
12
which is negative for M suciently high. Likewise, we conclude that the marginal payo for cutting
two links to a community is also negative. On the other hand, if a player in a peripheral community





mM   m   1
12
15which is negative for suciently large M. The creation of an additional link between two members of




which is negative given the conditions stated in this example. Since this is the most protable outcome
that can result from the creation of a new link, we conclude that this network is PNE under those
conditions.
The previous example illustrates the fact that bridge-agents can be sustained in PNE networks and
that the latter can enjoy much larger payos than others.
Propositions 2 and 3 restrict to the multi-community component Ci. But, notice that for MCi
suciently large, Proposition 3 implies that there will be some non-essential agent with external links.
Lemma 1 implies that, in such a case, any PNE network should be connected. In consequence:
Corollary 1 Given ch, a network with isolated communities and a multi-community component Ci can
be sustained as a PNE only if MCi is suciently low.
Finally, we would like to remark an expositional note. In our results we consider ch as xed and
focus on the analysis of both the size and the number of communities. Analogously, we might have
xed these two variables and focus on the eects of ch on the possibilities of having bridge agents. In
that case, we can expect that the lower is ch the lower is the number of essential players that can be
sustained in a PNE network because circumventing an essential agent is easier. Notice also that for a
given essential agent i, a lower ch would imply a lower upper bound in the size of all i-groups except
one. In a network with long geodesic distances, this would imply that bridge agents should be located
in peripheral positions.
164 Conclusion
Empirical evidence indicates (Burt, 2004) that structural holes in social networks (that is, the lack of
connections among agents) generate potential large benets to those individuals who succeed in bridging
them and, consequently, large payo dierences among agents. The persistence of such payo dieren-
tials when perfectly informed ex-ante identical agents are able to choose their social links strategically
is surprising. Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) provide the rst attempt to address this puzzle. The
authors present a model of network formation in which agents may exploit positional advantages if
they can block protable bilateral interactions between players who are not direct neighbors. In that
model the star network arises as a prominent equilibrium structure. In such a network, a single agent
is essential to connect any pair of individuals and this allows her to obtain a larger payo than others.
This argument formalizes the above-mentioned empirical fact without relying on imperfect information
or agents' heterogeneity.
Empirical observation indicates that social networks are usually formed by densely linked groups of
agents loosely connected to one another. In this paper we show the conditions under which structural
holes and players who benet from them can exist in this kind of networks. Our model shares the basic
features of Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) but assumes that agents are distributed in densely con-
nected multi-personal communities, reproducing the empirical regularities of social networks. The main
contribution of the paper is to show that to sustain bridge-agents in PNE: (i) the size of communities
cannot be too large and (ii) in most cases, bridge-agents must be located in peripheral positions in the
network. These restrictions do not prevent agents bridging structural holes from enjoying large payo
dierentials. We provided two examples to illustrate this last point.
Further empirical research should aim at testing the importance of the conditions mentioned above
in determining the possibilities of having bridge-agents in social networks.
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19A Proofs
First, we introduce two preliminary lemmas. Their proof is omitted here because they are immediate
applications of two analogous lemmas set forth by Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007). Lemma 2 refers
to the marginal payo of critical links. These are links that dene the unique path between the two
players involved and whose deletion increase the number of components. By Remark 1, critical links
can only connect players from dierent communities in a PNE network; therefore critical links are not
just the unique path between two players, they are also the unique path between communities.
Lemma 2 Consider any network g. If gij = 1 and the link is critical, then the marginal payo of the
link gij for both players (i and j) is exactly the same.
Lemma 3 In a network g, any component has at least two non-essential communities.
Proof of Lemma 1.
Assume by contradiction that g is a PNE network with at least two components Ci and Cj and that
i 2 Ci is a non-essential agent with some external link. Let N r
i (g) = fj 2 Ci : e(i;j) = rg be the set of
agents whom i accesses via r essential players and r
i(g) = jN r














i (g)   ch  0 (*)
where R is the maximal number of essential players between i and any other agent in Ci.
20Let j 2 Mj be an agent in a dierent component Cj and remember that mj = jMjj. Consider the
































































































where the last inequality follows from condition (*). Since 1
R + 1
R+1   1
R 1 > 0; 8R  3, we can conclude
that j  0. By Lemma 2, player i will also have incentives to deviate. Thus g is not a PNE network.
This contradiction completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.
By contradiction let us assume that g has at least two components Ci and Cj that contain more
than one community. By Lemma 1 all agents with external links must be essential agents in any
PNE. Moreover, by Lemma 3 there are at least two non-essential communities in each component. In
consequence, one of the next two cases must hold:
 Some non-essential community (say Mi) is extreme.
By Lemma 1, all agents with external links must be essential. In consequence, the unique possi-
bility is that Mi has only one external link (say gik). In a PNE, the link gik should be protable
for both. Then, some player j 2 Mj in Cj would nd optimal to create a link to k if mj  mi
15.
And so would player k (by Lemma 2).
 All non-essential communities are non-extreme.
15This is a sucient condition but not necessary. For example, mj could be lower than mi but if Cj include many
other agents apart from those in Mj, then the creation of gjk would also be protable.
21Let Mi be a non-essential community in Ci. By Lemma 1, a single agent i 2 Mi must have
external links. Notice also that by assumption, player i's number of external links is at least two.
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The rst inequality is immediate, while we use i(g)  2 for deriving the second inequality. We can
directly compare the last expression with respect to (**) to conclude that j  0 if mj  mi.
Again by applying Lemma 2, both i and j would have incentives to form a link between them if
mj  mi.
Thus, for any essential agent i 2 Ci with external links, mi > mj should hold in a PNE network
for any agent j 2 Mj in Cj. Since both components Ci and Cj should include essential agents with
22external links in a PNE (Lemma 1), that inequality cannot hold for all pair of agents. Therefore, a
PNE network cannot include two components with more than one community.
Notice also that the above results also show that the size of the isolated communities should be
suciently small. In particular, the size of that isolated communities should be lower than the size of
any non-essential neighborhood.
23